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BOOK REVIEWS 603 
In effect, Ehrenberg compared the average wage rate in a unionized 
monopoly firm against the average of all other wage rates, union and non- 
union. Since the majority of all workers are nonunion, this is primarily a 
comparison of' the wage rates of unionized workers in a monopoly firm 
against the wage rates of nonunion workers. The commission argued that the 
average wage rate of the workers at New York Telephone should have been 
compared against the average wage rate of other unionized workers. Since 
there is an empirically established overall union/nonunion wage differential, 
this comparison would essentially have uncovered whether the union/ 
nonunion wage differential was systematically greater in a particular 
regulated-monopoly industry. If this had been the case, the commission 
apparently would have been prepared to disallow further labor-cost increases 
as within the scope of its mandate to regulate monopoly power but not union 
power. 
Ehrenberg really offers no convincing argument against the commission's 
position. Moreover, although he does not offer the necessary empirical work 
to test the appropriate factual issues, I suspect that such a study would not 
demonstrate that union/nonunion wage differentials were higher among 
unionized employees of monopoly firms than among other unionized work- 
ers. Historically, for example, union/nonunion wage differentials have been 
highest among construction workers and mine workers, both relatively com- 
petitive industries. 
The difficulty here is that the commission's position essentially takes the 
presence of unionization as exogenous and asks merely whether the presence 
of regulated monopoly exacerbates union wage pressures. This position ig- 
nores the really important question of whether an industry might not have 
become unionized because it is a regulated monopoly. In this case the presence 
of the union is endogenous to the regulatory process, and the appropriate 
wage comparison is akin to the one Ehrenberg offers. The anecdotal evidence 
he presents of the evolution of the Bell System bargaining structure as well as 
the well-known anecdotal evidence regarding the trucking and railroad in- 
dustries and the history of the Davis-Bacon Act in contract construction all 
support this interpretation. As Ehrenberg's experience clearly demonstrates, 
however, making this case before a regulatory commission is likely to be a 
thankless task, and perhaps not very remunerative either. 
ORLEY ASHENFELTER 
Princeton Universily 
Law, Le islatio (and Liberty: A New, Statement of the Liberal Printciples justice and 
Political EcononIy. Vol. 3: The Political Order ojfa Free People. By FRIEDRICH A. 
HAYE K. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979. Pp. 243. $14.00; London and 
Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979. Pp. 243. ?5.95. 
But to avoid this [destroying our civilization] we must shed the 
illusion that we can deliberately create the future of mankind. 
This is the final conclusion of the forty years which I have 
devoted . 
I want to thank Kaj Areskoug, Fritz Machlup, Ingo Walter, and Lee Wohlfert for 
comments on an earlier draft of this review. 
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These dramatic words end the third and last volume of' Law, Legislationi t0(1 
Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and Political Economy 
(hereafter cited as LLL) by Nobel laureate Friedrich A. Hayek. The recently 
published volume, 7The Political Order ola Free People, analyzes the undermin- 
ing of' democratic principles and liberty in parliamentary democracies and 
concludes with an outline of' a new constitutional framework. 
The message of Hayek's voluminous work since World War IP is, to put it 
briefly, that the current political system of' Western democracies is bound to 
cause increasing coercion of individuals by governments, private groups, and 
firms, and that governmental decisions will increasingly be contrary to the 
opinions of' the majority. He argues in volume 3 that the unlimited powers 
(sovereignty) of governments-combined with the belief and expectation that 
governments can direct production, consumption, and the distribution of' 
income to maximize social welfare-are the necessary and sufficient condi- 
tions for this development. The constitutional proposal is designed to subject 
the government to substantial constraints in its use of coercive powers. 
The previous two volumes of LLL (Hayek 1973, 1976b) provide the f'oun- 
dation fbr the analyses of the political process in volume 3, but the last can be 
read independently. Rules and Order analyzes the role of rules and law in a 
"free" society-one in which no individual can be coerced to act in accordance 
with the will of others. Law must represent general principles of just conduct 
on which there is common agreement. Coercion must be used only to enforce 
such general principles applicable to all individuals. TFhe Mirage of Social Justice 
discusses the limits of reason and rationality in social design and the imnpossi- 
bility of' defining social justice. Some arguments in these two volumes will be 
referred to below to clarify the discussion of volume 3. 
The "Bargaining" Democracy and Logrolling 
Hayek uses the concept of the bargaining democracy to describe a system of' 
representative assemblies within which different interest groups can trade in 
vote support for each other's proposals. In the theory of public finance, this is 
called logrolling2 and is generally regarded as an improvement in the demo- 
cratic process because the strength of preferences can be allowed to affect the 
outcome. Hayek, on the other hand, argues that the trade in vote support 
contributes to results that do not reflect the opinions of the majority. These 
views are clearly contradictory, yet the abstract nature of' Hayek's analysis of' 
the democratic process makes a comparison with conventional public finance 
difficult. However, Hayek's criticism of' trade in vote support within repre- 
sentative assemblies is directed at the wide range of' issues on which such 
practices are possible rather than at the principle of logrolling itself. The 
argument is derived from the distinction between votes on general rules of 
just conduct applicable to all citizens (i.e., legislation proper, such as private 
and criminal law) and votes on the distribution of' payments and benefits 
among individuals and groups in society. The latter include all votes on taxes 
and transfer payments, allocation decisions with income redistribution impli- 
cations, and "directives" that discriminate in favor of certain groups. [he 
representative assemblies in all democracies do in fact practice logrolling oln 
both types of issues. It is, therefore, possible that the distribution of benefits 
[I his work inclultes such classics as The Road to Serfdom (1944) and The Coost/iotion of 
Liberty (1960). 
2 See, e.g., bullock 1969. 
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on which a majority decide at the same time violates general rules on which 
the same majority agree. For example, a principle of taxation can be ac- 
cepted while special benefits (e.g., tariffs and subsidies) with implicit positive 
or negative tax equivalents are passed by the same assembly, violating the 
agreed-on principle. It appears that the theory of logrolling is valid for votes 
on the distribution of benefits and payments only when no general agreed-on 
principle is applicable. Only pure collective goods are likely to satisfy this 
condition when a principle of taxation has been laid down, because individu- 
als can be assigned tax equivalents for other publicly provided services and 
benefits. 
The coercive powers of governments to benefit some groups at the expense 
of others, in addition to enforcing generally agreed-on principles, is the 
source of what Hayek calls "the miscarriage of the democratic ideal" (p. 98). 
These powers make it possible and advantageous to trade in specific benefits 
as well as to trade in benefits for support of general principles. Moreover, 
well-organized interests are likely to gain disproportionate weights in the 
democratic process-"there is no limit to the blackmail to which governments 
will be subject" when "no superior judiciary authority can prevent the legis- 
lature from granting privileges to particular groups" (p. 1 1).3 The final 
outcome of the democratic process need not, then, correspond to anybody's 
opinion on what is right or to the will of the majority.4 Hayek argues, in fact, 
that this concept can be stated only in terms of general rules and principles.5 
Behavioral incentives of the rules are lost and the will of the majority cannot 
be given contents when representatives decide both on general rules and on 
adjustments to the outcome of individuals' activities that are performed 
subject to these rules. 
A Model Constitution 
Hayek outlines a constitution designed both to make the outcome of the 
democratic process coincide with principles held by the majority and to 
minimize the degree of coercion in society.6 The proposal is very simple: 
Distinguish between legislation proper and decisions on government spend- 
ing, administration, and regulation by separating the two functions into two 
distinct assemblies elected by entirely different procedures. Make the gov- 
ernment body subject to the general rules of conduct decided upon by the 
3 A suggestion like Friedman and Friedman's (1980) to legally prohibit the use of 
tariffs for the benefit of special-interest groups can obviously not get to the root of the 
problem of the democracy in Hayek's view as long as the government has the coercive 
power to use a multitude of alternative means of creating special benefits for the same 
groups. 
4 Note that Hayek regards the state of democracy in the United States as threatened 
as are the parliamentary democracies in Europe because the judiciary branch of the 
American government does generally not subject decisions of Congress to a test against 
general principles-though this may have been the intention of the Founding Fathers. 
5 This argument is developed in vol. 2 of LLL. 
6 Fritz Machlup has pointed out to me that one could argue that Hayek's proposal for 
constitutional reform contradicts his own views on the creation of human institutions. 
While Hayek argues that human institutions cannot be designed rationally and deliber- 
ately for the benefit of mankind, he also argues that they cannot develop spontaneously 
in accordance with people's preferences unless the conditions for such developments 
exist. The proposal constitutes a deliberate design for the purpose of creating such 
conditions. 
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legislative assembly. Hayek's model constitution also contains a general decla- 
ration of' rights and an important definition of what qualifies as law-a 
general rule of just conduct. A constitutional court would be established to 
test the appropriateness of the legislature's decisions against such a definition. 
The leg'slative a Ussebly would be responsible for the body of criminal and 
private law, the principles of taxation, general regulations for safety and 
health, rules to secure competitive markets, corporate law, and the like. The 
coercive powers of' governments would be limited to the enforcement of' these 
general rules and principles. 
The government assembly would decide on the use of' material and human 
resources entrusted to the public sector. The size and the general purposes of' 
expenditures would be limited only indirectly by the general rules of' conduct 
set (lown by the legislative assembly and by people's willingness to pay taxes. 
The general principles of' taxation decided upon in the legislative assembly 
would make citizens aware of their share in payments for specific services. 
This would prevent the current practice of disguising tax burdens to "make 
those who will ultimately have to bear it [the burden] as little aware of it as 
possible" (p. 127). 
Would the proposed constitution achieve its purposes? A critical issue 
seems to be whether the legislative assembly can be prevented from instituting 
laws favoring large groups or wealthy interests. Hayek presents a number of 
suggestions in this regard. More important, however, is the definition of "law" 
and the role of' the constitutional court in evaluating the constitutionality of 
legislation against this definition. Hayek characterizes (p. 109) a law as nega- 
tive in the sense that it does not "aim at achieving concrete purposes," it must 
be applicable to an "indefinite number of unknown future instances," and it 
must exclude "all provisions intended or known to affect principally particu- 
lar identifiable individuals or groups." This definition would apparently rule 
out legislation covering such issues as minimum wages and price controls. 
However, the boundary between measures to improve information spreading 
in the market and the protection of particular firms or groups is sometimes 
extremely vague, as in the case of' legislation on health standards, consumer 
protection, and occupational safety. It is therefore easy to imagine situations 
in which the members of the constitutional court assume a critical role. The 
experience with the U.S. Supreme Court indicates that the existence of a 
constitutional court does not necessarily provide a complete safeguard against 
legislation that favors large groups in society. A simple addition to Hayek's 
proposal could help achieving his purpose-Wicksell's old suggestion 
(Wicksell 1896) of' qualified majorities and relative unanimity. A principle that 
legislation must be passed by, for example, 90 percent of the assembly hardly 
seems objectionable since decisions on general rules must reflect the stan- 
dards of' most citizens to be respected and justify coercion in enforcement. 
Where does Hayek's proposal lead? Debate on it cannot be carried out 
without reference to more specific results. Since the author provides only 
general and abstract clues, I will here attempt to illustrate some potential 
consequences by relating it to a few economic political issues. 
The inflationary bias of' current democracies has been a theme in Hayek's 
earlier writings and is clearly linked to the subject of this volume since 
inflation is one way for governments to disguise the true tax burden. The 
independence of the central bank from the government seems guaranteed 
under the proposed constitution because directives covering the central bank 
will have to take the form of general rules unrelated to specific political and 
economic circumstances. ihis provides a check on the monetization of gov- 
This content downloaded from 206.211.139.204 on Thu, 8 Jan 2015 19:18:28 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
BOOK REVIEWS 607 
erninent fiscal deficits.7 Inflationary pressures could also be reduced under 
the proposed constitution because the government would be unable to bear 
the costs of' unemployment and business failures. Most market interventions 
in the form of' subsidies to labor or capital are likely to violate the general 
rules by which the government must abide. This could contribute to higher 
wage and price flexibility.8 Furthermore, governments must consider its ex- 
penditures more carefully when the corresponding tax burden for each 
individual has been established by the legislature.9 
A more controversial consequence of the proposed constitution would be 
that developments in production, consumption, and income distribution to 
which a majority object have to be accepted unless a general rule has in fact 
been violated. However, the outcome of economic activities may shed new 
light on a particular principle and lead to a change therein. The extremely 
far-reaching implications of this can be illustrated with the examples of 
immigration laws and equity-oriented policies. 
Immigration restrictions appear to be unconstitutional, as do tariffs or 
import quotas, under Hayek's proposal. Such policy measures are clearly 
directed at identifiable individuals to achieve concrete purposes-economic 
benefits for national residents and firms. Opening up the Western indus- 
trialized economies to unlimited immigration would lead to a social transfor- 
mation of enormous proportions. Most people would probably find the out- 
come unacceptable. Nevertheless, they would have to accept immigration as 
the "will of the majority" unless a general principle could be found to prevent 
immigration without thwarting other desirable outcomes, such as imports of 
competitive foreign goods. 
Most policies aimed at securing certain levels of incomes for individuals or 
groups also have to be given up by governments that must abide by general 
principles. Discrimination is necessary to guarantee the outcome of economic 
activities pertaining to an individual. This is illustrated in volume 2 of LLL by 
a revealing and sharply satirical analysis of the contents of the United Nations 
Universal I)edaratilon of Human Rights. This declaration contains positive rights 
(to outcomes) as well as traditional civil rights (to equal treatment before the 
law as defined by general rules of conduct). The two kinds of rights are simply 
contradictory. Either governments treat unequal people equally, abiding by 
generally accepted rules, or they treat unequal people unequally to secure 
certain outcomes. The only available policy instrument aimed at securing a 
certain income distribution would be the general tax structure. Thus, a 
negative income tax would have to be substituted for large parts of the social 
security system. 
The examples above suffice to show that the constitutional proposal is far 
from politically feasible in the foreseeable future. There is probably no 
significant political group in any democracy that bases its political targets on 
7 Hayek earlier suggested the denationalization of the right to issue money (Hayek 
1976a). Though a possibility, this suggestion is not part of the proposal here. 
8 "Social responsibility" must be the major check on wage and cost increases in an 
economy in which the government guarantees employment independent of the wage/ 
cost structure (cf. Wihlborg 1978). 
9 Hayek's proposal can here be compared with the current discussion about a con- 
stitutional amendment prohibiting an unbalanced government budget. Just as tariffs 
cannot reduce the political pressures to discriminate in favor of a particular industry, a 
constitutional amendment to balance the budget does not reduce the political incentive 
to tax via inflation. Ihus, the political process can be used, e.g., to manipulate the 
definition of the government budget-rendering the amendment meaningless. 
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general principles rather than on desired outcomes. Moreover, the proposal 
does not address the question of whether any outcome under a certain 
principle is acceptable. For example, is it not necessary to discriminate in order 
to secure survival of an individual who spends the negative income tax 
payments almost on receipt? Should hospital care be denied individuals who 
have chosen not to invest in medical insurance? Hayek has previously sug- 
gested ways of resolving these questions with a minimum of government 
coercion (Hayek 1960). It is not clear, however, that these solutions are 
commensurate with strict adherence to the constitutional principles outlined 
here. Despite such questions, Hayek's proposal deserves serious consideration 
as the starting point for further work by economists and social philosophers. 
A fundamental constitutional change may indeed be the only route to pre- 
vent further erosion of democratic values and individual liberty. Hayek has 
argued-convincingly, in my view-that the coercive powers given to gov- 
ernments, in the belief that progress can and should be planned and directed, 
are the cause of a self-generating process leading to the destruction of the 
decentralized market economies in which a high degree of individual liberty 
remains feasible. 
Hayek's constitutional proposal implies quite simply that we give up the 
idea of steering and planning the future direction of social and economic 
activities. Instead, we should ask how we can set up a system of general 
principles under which mankind's knowledge can ensure progress for the 
maximum benefit of all. In Hayek's words: "To pretend to know the desirable 
direction of progress seems to me to be the extreme of hubris.... All we can 
do is to create favorable conditions for it [progress] and then hope for the 
best" (p. 169). 
CLAS W 1113BORG 
New York Uniiversity 
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